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The United States has a critical interest 
in Russia’s stability, in its economic 
success, and its eventual transition into
a market-oriented democracy. The 
circumstances in which the Russian
economy finds itself today should only
heighten this interest. 
Russia faces enormous challenges,
but its economy is rebounding and 
continues to move in a market-oriented
direction. New political leadership
offers real opportunities as well as
uncertainties.
Much of what happens in the
Russian economy in the coming years
will be determined by business —
Russian and international — far more
than by government policies. In light of
the growing importance of business
investment in shaping the Russian
economy, CED and The EastWest
Institute conducted this in-depth and
inside look at the state of emerging
capitalism in Russia and on future
directions in U.S.-Russian relations.
This publication contains highlights of the
remarks by the Forum’s participants:
Charles Kolb, President 
Committee for Economic Development — page 1
Robert Legvold, Professor of Political Science 
Columbia University — page 2
George F. Russell, Jr., Chairman 
Frank Russell Company — page 7
Peter Charow, Executive Vice President 
EastWest Institute; Former Vice President 
for Commercial Development and Chief
Representative, BPA Exploration 
for BP Amoco in Moscow — page 7
Scott Blacklin, President 
American Chamber of Commerce 
in Russia — page 10
Bernard Sucher, Troika Dialog — page 12
Aleksandr V. Surikov, Economic Senior Counselor 
Embassy of the Russian Federation — page 14
John R. Price, Managing Director 
Chase Manhattan Corporation — page 16
Eugene Lawson, President 
U.S.-Russia Business Council — page 16
Doug Gardner, Partner 
Arthur Andersen, Moscow — page 18
Jack Brougher, Director 
Russia and Independent States, 
U.S. Department of Commerce — page 20
John H. Schmidt, Director 
Russian Cooperation Program, Boeing — page 22
CHARLES KOLB
President
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The Committee for Economic
Development is an organization of
American business leaders. For over
50 years, CED has been a vehicle for
American business to have a voice in
guiding U.S. public policy — not only
on trade and international issues, but
on the broader economic and social
policies that shape the environment in
which we work and the communities in
which we live. 
CED Trustees have always believed
that it is important for the business
perspective to be heard when govern-
ments determine their international
economic and trade policies. Through
CED’s policy statements and through
the network of counterpart organiza-
tions we have in Europe, Japan, and
Australia, CED has been especially
effective in bringing a business voice to
bear when critical policy decisions are
being made and when the United
States needs to stake out its position
on key international agreements.
This Forum is an effort to focus on
the role of the business community in
ensuring Russia’s economic success.
Rather than debate “Who Lost
Russia?,” our focus is on the role that
the American and Russian business
communities can play in fostering sta-
bility, economic growth, and the rule
of law in Russia. 
We are pleased to be working with
the EastWest Institute on this effort.
The mission of the EastWest Institute is
to help defuse tensions and conflicts
that threaten world stability while
building democracy, free enterprise,
and prosperity in Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia, and the states of
Eurasia.
We are especially grateful to 
CED Trustee George F. Russell, Jr.,
Chairman of the Frank Russell
Company and a Board member of the
EastWest Institute, for bringing our
two organizations together. 
Vladimir Putin and his cabinet face
an economy that has severely struggled
since the end of communism. Their
“free market” system is wrestling with
corruption and crime and challenges
to the rule of law.
A great deal will be riding on
Russia’s new administration and
whether they have the political muscle
to implement reforms and attract for-
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eign investment. There is enormous
potential in Russia, and investors need
to know there is stability. That is why
CED has co-sponsored today’s panel
discussion.
ROBERT LEGVOLD
Professor of Political 
Science
Columbia University
There are enormous historical changes
taking place in Russia and the other
post-Soviet states on a scale that we
have not seen in the modern age.
That leads to two basic proposi-
tions. The first one is that the chal-
lenges that Russia faces today are larg-
er than the capacities of their leader-
ship. They are challenges that no
leader or group of leaders, however
skilled, however talented, will be able
to resolve in short order. Therefore,
while “Putinology” is fascinating, it
really is quite secondary.
The second proposition is that
Russia’s underlying problems are an
enormously tangled knot. They have
been accumulating in an incremental
fashion over more than ten years now,
going back to the Soviet period.
That means that if Russia is to suc-
ceed, almost certainly it will be as a
result of incremental progress, not as 
a result of a grand dénouement pro-
duced by a successful macroeconomic
and political strategy that Putin may
lay out in the first hundred days of his
administration.
The challenges he faces at home,
and particularly in the economic
realm, are deep and structural.
The first obstacle is sustainable
growth. Sustainable growth is very dif-
ferent from the growth we are seeing
at the moment in Russia. The second
obstacle and challenge on the internal
side in Russia is to achieve economic
reform that sticks, that becomes insti-
tutionalized, and that makes a differ-
ence.
When we speak of our expectations
for Putin, we talk about things like
reducing the tax burden and rational-
izing the tax code, strengthening prop-
erty rights, carrying out land reform,
redoing the pension system within the
country. If the challenge is reduced to
this level — rationalizing a tax system,
pursuing land reform and the like —
and these are then addressed with the
partial and the half measures that most
certainly will be the product of the cur-
rent political milieu, then I think little
will have been done to meet the
underlying challenges. There is a 
danger that one will grow comfortable
with half measures because of what 
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I call premature optimism about
Russia having already turned the 
corner. 
Much rhetoric lately has been
focused on 3 1/2 percent growth over
the past year,  last year’s 8 percent
industrial growth, and 12 percent
industrial growth in the first quarter 
of this year, with a prospect now that
even exports will begin to grow after
having been flat last year.
This is not sustainable growth. It
doesn’t yet demonstrate that Russia
has tackled the underlying problems.
Nor has it achieved an economic mira-
cle the way its escape from the August
1998 financial crisis is sometimes 
characterized, because this was due 
to $30-a-barrel oil, which was a happy
fortuity, together with the benefit of a
six-fold devaluation of the ruble that
created a powerful impulse to domes-
tic manufacturing. Everyone who deals
with Russia knows what is behind the 
3 1/2 percent growth. 
What many don’t know, is that this
was growth that was achieved through
continuing important subsidization
and production within Russia. In 1998,
domestic producers paid 80 percent of
world-market prices for oil. In 1999,
they paid 20 percent of world prices
for oil. There were comparable subsi-
dies built into what producers paid in
1999 for electricity. The same thing
was true with regard to their labor
costs. The decrease was two times the
amount the previous year. Now, labor
prices are rising within Russia. 
The problem is that as one grows
comfortable with subsidization, it will
further rationalize the half measures
that are taken.
One of the themes of Putin’s
reform agenda is that the state is too
large and should be cut back. Last
year, 93,000 new employees went to
work for the Russian state. Rather than
getting smaller, the Russian state is
something like 35 to 40 percent larger
today than it was when the Soviet
Union collapsed. Nothing good will
happen until that is cut back in some
fashion.
There are two risks when talking
about cutting the state back. The first is
that it will be driven largely by a 
single economic theory — that we 
need to cut costs. We have seen the
result of mechanical theories applied to
political and economic reform in Russia
and they have played a large role in the
fix Russia finds itself in today. 
The problem of dealing with the
state in Russia today may be parallel 
to the problem of dealing with the
Russian military. One of the reasons
why military reform in Russia has
failed is precisely because they haven’t
had the money to carry it out.
Reforming the state is also something
that is going to require a certain
amount of money, not merely cost 
cutting.
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Second, there needs to be a point
to scaling back the state. It is fine to
deregulate the economy by reducing
state interference. But if the tax
reforms are simply taken in terms of
reducing the tax burden, then a reduc-
tion really only affects the taxes that
are not being paid— that is, it will be a
reduction in what might be called vir-
tual taxes. And if the cuts in state
spending are cuts in those benefits
that have never been paid, which is the
other portion of the virtual social
economy in this context, then you are
going to get very little effect. Arkadiy
Drakhovich, who is in charge of this
part of the plan has confessed that the
real reduction in the tax burden is
likely to be 3 percent of GDP rather
than a more substantial cut of the 40
percent the tax burden currently rep-
resents, a portion of which is in virtual
taxes. 
Internally, Putin has to focus on
three areas. First, he has to attack the
core of what some have called the 
virtual economy. That is, the industrial
core, which is not salvageable – the
industrial core which is value-destroy-
ing. That can only be done with mean-
ingful bankruptcy procedures, which
in turn, can only be done if the regime
is prepared to see an important por-
tion of the economy transformed by
going under. And as the IMF has
emphasized, it is critical to ensure that
there is an adequate social safety net
or provisions made if, in fact, the
Russians do become serious about
allowing nonviable industry to go
under.
The second part is meaningful
banking reform — reform that will
produce a viable commercial banking 
sector. Direct foreign investment is not
soon going to return to Russia. This is
a country that, after ten years of inde-
pendence, has a level of direct foreign
investment which is the equal of Peru.
That is not going to change in the
near term. Direct foreign investment
went up last year from $2.8 billion in
1998 to $2.9 billion in 1999. But this
will not be the solution. In fact, you
will sooner see the domestic capital
flight to Cyprus and the coast of Spain
and elsewhere return when things are
done properly in Russia than you will
other direct foreign investment. 
Therefore, I see a viable commer-
cial banking system as absolutely 
essential for tapping what internal 
capital resources there are, and getting
them to potentially productive enter-
prises. Foreign banks must be allowed
to come in and create a much more
competitive and efficient modernized
banking sector.
The third item is introducing com-
petition into the state monopolies. It 
is unlikely that the three great state
monopolies — Gazrom, RAO UES, 
and the state railway system — will be
broken up. It isn’t going to happen.
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But I think the leadership is weighing
the idea of trying to introduce some
competition into these sectors. I think
it is likely to happen with Gazrom
soonest. It may be to allow the oil com-
panies to use the Gazrom-owned pipe
system. That would be useful. But this
is only the beginning of a process of
transforming what is the value-destroy-
ing segment of the economy, and that
is to begin trimming the effects of the
state monopolies by introducing com-
petition. 
The most important task that Putin
faces, however, is not strengthening
the Russian state, but normalizing
the Russian state. That is, reacquiring
sufficient control over all levels of gov-
ernment so that the state can perform
for the public good or for the com-
mon good the critical tasks that states
need to perform.
It is not clear that Putin and the
people around him think in these
terms. He has spoken a good deal about
strengthening the Russian state. It often
appears that when he talks about it he
means the power of the Russian state,
even in some ways the prestige of the
Soviet state, certainly in terms of the
credibility of the Russian state with its
citizens and foreign governments. 
And he has spoken often in terms of 
law and order. That is a very different
thing from speaking about a state
strengthened by strengthening constitu-
tionalism; a state that operates under
the rule of law. Putin has an enormous
commitment to law-abiding behavior,
but I think his commitment to law-abid-
ing behavior is that of a middle-level
bureaucrat who understands the way in
which people are supposed to obey and
abide by existing rules. But the extent to
which you would normalize the state by
undoing the privatization by creating 
a genuine rule of law — that we would 
recognize as congenial to the effective
operation of a state — it is not clear that
he understands it in those terms.
Whether he understands that
strengthening, that is, normalizing the
Russian state means “de-privatizing” it
is another matter. For the Russian state
has, indeed, been privatized — that is,
every level of government, from the
cop on the beat to senior levels of 
ministries has been subordinated to
the private interests of the officials
who occupy these posts.
He does, however, mean to
strengthen the state. The first and
most important step he has taken to
this point is to create seven regional
administrations.  It may be a step for-
ward if Putin understands that, for 
government to work, for the state to
work, you have to have a rationalized
relationship between the center and
the regions. That doesn’t mean neces-
sarily centralizing it, putting it back in
the control of Moscow, but it does
mean an effective division of labor
among different levels of government.
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He is not wrong to say that the situ-
ation is untenable if, according to his
figures, 20,000 laws have been institut-
ed by government at a lower level that
are inconsistent with the federal con-
stitution. Something has to be done to
rationalize the relationship between
procedures in local fiefdoms, as they
are now often called, and the opera-
tion of the federal government.
Alas, I suspect the reason most of
the governors, including those who
have operated their own fiefdoms
appear not to be upset with this new
measure is that they see it as a 
chance to get the local presidential
representatives, who until now have
been overseeing their work, off their
backs and out of their locales.
Turning to the external dimension,
Russia has to let its foreign policy
agenda be driven by its domestic agen-
da. That domestic agenda is over-
whelmingly economic, which means
that Russia’s focus has to be on a new
and changed international environ-
ment that is overwhelmingly econom-
ic, including the globalized interna-
tional economic and political order.
This will not lead Russia to embrace
liberal internationalism or a new 
economic Wilsonianism. Russia will
continue in all likelihood to pursue 
a hard-headed, carrot-and-stick 
policy, especially with their immediate 
neighbors.
The U.S.-Russian relationship has
deteriorated to the point where it will
be extraordinarily difficult for the
United States to exercise leadership in
developing a constructive relationship
with Russia even if Russia’s domestic
picture does turn around. I think the
United States is in the process of disen-
gaging from Russia, not of engaging
Russia. It is in fact walking away from
the problem. Most of the U.S. leader-
ship whether in Congress or in a new
American administration will not
revive a serious or ambitious approach
to the Russian challenge. We will con-
tinue to look for reasons to ignore or
downplay the significance of Russian
events and Russian concerns.
The outstanding illustration of that
will be the way in which we handle key
arms-control issues like the national
missile defense and the potential
threat that it represents to the ABM
regime. Such is only the tip of the ice-
berg. It is symptomatic of what is a
general approach at this point: Namely
that we alone will decide unilaterally
what serves our security. If that is not
compatible with enhancing some level
of cooperation with Russia, so be it.
The presumption behind that is that
we can afford it because what happens
in Russia or, for that matter, in this
part of the world, even if it is for ill, is
tolerable. I think this is an enormous
mistake. 
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PANEL 1 — RUSSIA
Challenges to Economic
Development 
and Integration in 
the World Economy 
after Yeltsin 
MODERATOR: 
GEORGE F. RUSSELL, JR.
Chairman 
Frank Russell Company 
I think Professor Legvold’s talk was fas-
cinating. I for one have been propos-
ing that Russia join NATO as a means
to further engage that country.
Our first panel is focused on invest-
ment in Russia’s private sector. I notice
that President Putin’s six points, deliv-
ered on December 28, 1999, were as
follows:
1. A mulitpolar world
2. Global security
3. Nonproliferation and control of
nuclear and conventional weapons
4. Prevention of regional conflicts
5. International peace keeping 
6. Integration into the global 
economy
If you accept this list, the world 
will be a safer place, and Russia will
become a competitive player on the
world’s economic stage.
PETER CHAROW
Executive Vice President 
The EastWest Institute
Russia has taken on the appearance of
a market economy, especially when you
look at it from the outside. Much of
the reform effort, however, has been
focused on stabilizing the domestic
economy and attracting domestic and
inbound foreign investment. This
means that Russia’s integration into
the global economy is at best at a
somewhat early stage, characterized
primarily by the trading of commodi-
ties coming out of Russia for finished
goods coming into Russia, capital 
outflows (including flight capital) and
foreign direct investment.
There has been very little in terms
of real foreign capital investment in
Russian enterprises. There has been
almost no Russian capital investment
from outside Russia. In terms of coop-
eration between Russian enterprises or
corporations and multinational corpo-
rations outside of Russia, we also have
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seen very little activity. So the question
of Russia’s integration into the global
economy is still very much unan-
swered.
For serious foreign investors trying
to operate in a Western investment
environment, Russia is an extremely 
difficult operating environment at this
time. Although it appears to have a cap-
italistic system, it doesn’t really function
the way Western capitalism functions.
This is because the whole process has
been a revolution from above, rather
than an organic development.
Russia has always been ruled by
individuals rather than governed by
laws. As a result, although there are
laws in place which look clear and
seem to be implemented and support-
ed by the legal system, that is not
always the case.
We have this view in the United
States, which is supported by our leg-
islative system, that corporations func-
tion for the benefit of shareholders. In
Russia, you often run into a situation
— even though this is changing —
where managers look at you as a share-
holder and say, “This is my factory, this
is my enterprise. Don’t tell me what to
do. I have been running this place for
20 years or for 25 years. I know what is
best for the company, I know what is
best for my workers, I know what is
best for my community.”
There is also lack of distinction
between the state and the private
sector. One element of this is private
property. In Russia there is a very hazy
distinction between what is private
property and what is state property, or
maybe, more accurately, there is prop-
erty which is private, but which the
state can use whenever it decides that
it wants to do so. 
An example is when BP Amoco
went through a very difficult bankrupt-
cy battle. Admittedly, there were 
people in BP who were not familiar
with the Russian legal system. Yet we
brought between 75 and 100 legal
actions in Russian courts, both in the
outlying regions and in Moscow itself.
And all but one were decided against
us.
The one decision that was taken in
our favor was taken on a Friday after-
noon by the Supreme Court in
Moscow. Over the weekend, two
Russian officials flew in and met with
the judge. On Monday, he overturned
his decision without any comment.
This hazy distinction between the
state and private sectors leads to a 
lot of insider dealings. It also leads
inevitably to corruption, because every-
one is working very hard to try to 
influence the decisions before they are
made. When you have a huge bureau-
cracy which is very eager to intervene
in the markets, then it creates untold
opportunities for corruption, and in
some respects it serves to validate the
corruption.
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Markets, like democracies, are
based on the ability of participants to
reach compromise. In Russia, histori-
cally, the phrase has usually been not
“win-win,” but “who-whom.” This 
means, who will be the winner and
who will be the loser. 
There is a very deeply rooted lack
of trust in Russia. By trust, I mean indi-
viduals distrust the government, 
the government distrusts individuals,
and individuals distrust one another,
other than members of their own clan.
I don’t know exactly what it takes to
get over all these years of deeply root-
ed suspicion in the society, but 
without a fundamental level of trust
between actors in the economy, it
becomes very difficult to conclude
transactions and certainly complicates
them. Trade deals are not so difficult
because they are one-shot types of
transactions which can be concluded
simply, but long-term investment, and
long-term cooperation, are very diffi-
cult if you have this deeply-rooted sus-
picion and lack of trust in the society.
In terms of values, what I ran into
quite consistently over the past few
years in Russia is the question: Should
there be one set of rules in Russia and
another set of rules outside of Russia?
Obviously, Western companies coming
into Russia and trying to do business
there are at a huge competitive disad-
vantage. You simply don’t have the
level of connections, you don’t under-
stand the system, you don’t understand
the culture, and often you don’t speak 
the language.  That is a normal com-
petitive disadvantage with which you
have to deal.
The West, however is not entirely
blameless in dealing with this. Many
Western business executives have said
to me, “If you are going to succeed in
Russia, you have to play by the Russian
rules.” People have come to me and
said, “I’ve been dealing in emerging
markets all around the world, and if
you are trying to apply Western stan-
dards in emerging markets, you might
as well give up and walk away.”
If that is the position you come in
with, then you have already lost the
game. In the long run you can’t use
one set of rules inside Russia and
another set of rules outside it. Another
conclusion we might draw from this is
that maybe it is time to think about
redirecting some of our resources
from pushing structural reform to
addressing some of the issues of cultur-
al values in Russia. If Russia views itself
as transforming into a market econo-
my and integrating itself into a global
economy, then this dissonance of val-
ues has to be addressed somehow. It
can be done in a positive and construc-
tive manner, without challenging the
cultural heritage of what has obviously
been a very successful and great nation
over the years.
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Lastly, we need to stop standing on
the outside and preaching to Russians
about what they should do to their
country. What we need to try to 
do instead is to help develop domestic
coalitions for reform, based on a set of
values which will support the type of
market system that the Russians them-
selves want to achieve.
There is a new breed of Russian
managers and business owners who are
very interested in running their busi-
nesses the way businesses are run in
the West, who are very interested 
in cooperating with multinational 
corporations and small to medium
enterprises in the West, and who are
very interested in spreading beyond
the borders of Russia and are willing 
to accept the consequences that all 
of this entails.
We need to be reaching out to and
embracing these elements of society in
Russia. We need to be supporting
them in what they are trying to do. We
need to help them understand how to
form associations, nonprofit organiza-
tions, groupings, and affiliations that
can have an influence on the political
process. In one word, we need to help
them pursue their own agenda.
SCOTT BLACKLIN
President 
American Chamber of 
Commerce in Russia
It is an exciting time for us, as busi-
nessmen and women, on what we like
to consider to be the front lines in
Russia. It has not been an enviable
place to be for the last two years or
more. Russia has been recovering from
the implosion of its economy from
August of 1998 and, arguably, the 
period of paralysis extended even 
further back in time.
Part of conducting a business is
having a global strategy. If you are to
have a global strategy, it cannot ignore
Russia. For the last two years, many
companies have been able to ignore
Russia. Russia is paralyzed. They think
nothing good is happening, therefore
we don’t have to look at it. Effective
December 31, 1999, that formula
changed. It began to change slowly at
first and now it is suddenly picking up
momentum.
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One of the things that we are see-
ing is the access to the decision-mak-
ers. We have never experienced this,
where the Russian government, the
think-tanks around the new govern-
ment, are so open to the new ideas of
reform. But, moreover, these are not
our ideas. The striking difference is
that these are their ideas. No longer
do we have to talk to the Russians
about the building blocks of lawmak-
ing or a pluralistic economy. Many of
these people know and believe it. So
the significant change that we have
seen is that the Russians are taking
ownership of their own agenda. They
are not waiting for tips, hints, pushes,
shoves, other types of incentives or 
disincentives from us. 
They do look for engagement, they
do look for understanding, they do
look for support, as they continue to
unravel a very complicated organiza-
tional revolution. So, point number
one is that the change is real.
Russians themselves are redefining
things. Traditionally, the Russians have
always looked at power in terms of
political and military muscle and the
kind of bully potential that it has 
associated with it. But increasingly we
are seeing Russians who understand
that Russian power is the creation of
wealth. Russian power depends on the
ability of that government to create
and capture cash flows.
We have to be very careful. The
Chamber has always been very aware
of the fact that we know we are for-
eigners, and in the final analysis it will
be the Russians who make the changes
for themselves. We do however have a
window in time through which we have
an opportunity to redefine our rela-
tionships and, of course, influence
events. We must continue to engage
the Russian Federation. There are
many, particularly on Capitol Hill, who
do not embrace this idea of engage-
ment, who would like to sit back and
say, “You Russians have A, B, C, D, E, F,
G to do; after you do it, then we will
begin to talk and we will begin to feel
you are real.” 
That view misses the point entirely.
Because we all have a stake in these
issues, the quality and the level of our
engagement will play a key role in the
success of Russia’s reforms.
So I would say, from the business
community, in the Russian Federation
in this time of uncertain flux and
uncertain duration, one thing is clear:
it is imperative to maintain and even
accelerate American cooperation and





In the beginning of October 1998, I
stood up in front of some of the
world’s most powerful investors to talk
about Russian capital markets. What I
told them was that, as bad as all this
seemed to be — and it really did seem
pretty bad — that things still seemed
to be working. Unlike the banking sys-
tem, the Russian capital markets still
had a price mechanism. We were con-
ducting business; we had experienced
very few, if any, serious failures. Maybe
nobody cared, but the thing still
worked. To the extent that markets go
through periods of extraordinary exu-
berance and panic, we could at least
look forward to some adjustment,
some swing back of the pendulum. 
And now, two years later, obviously
that is exactly what happened. So, by
holding on by the skin of our teeth,
when a lot of other folks were running
away, that prediction proved to be
pretty well made.
.
Russian capital markets came
through a crisis that few people in
business ever really have to endure —
a 90 percent drop in prices, a 90 per-
cent fall in people involved.
Over the last couple of years there
has been a quiet, but definite upsurge
of investment by Russians in their own
markets. They have precious little to
invest in regulated commercial instru-
ments, and there is probably more
going on in unregulated commercial
paper than anything else in fixed
income. But whether it is in equity or
whether it is an investment by Russian
companies in other Russian compa-
nies, that is daily bread for guys like us.
Russian capital responded to the
crisis in Russian markets and the
Russian economy by looking for
opportunity. We are talking about
small numbers, but in the almost com-
plete absence of Western interest,
Russians detected opportunity. Equity
markets jumped up six times from the
bottom in that short period of time,
enabling some people to make a lot 
of money.
We have seen Russian companies
focusing and developing their busi-
nesses with an eye to capital markets.
Russian managers are keenly aware of
the opportunities and the rewards of
realizing standards set by the world. 
That focus by Russian managers in
building their businesses and looking
for opportunities to grow with the help
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of outside investors is one of the key
driving forces that makes us optimistic
about doing business in Russian capital
markets.
In this time of crisis, we have made
big improvements in the actual
mechanics of business. Now that vol-
umes are rapidly growing again, we are
handling it. We have a marketplace
that looks much more like the 21st
century than the one we had a couple
of years ago. 
Our new corporate governance
bogie is creative uses of accounting,
people figuring out how to make their
income statement and their balance
sheet look good, but not necessarily
serving your interests as an outside 
shareholder. That may not be every-
body’s dream of an ideal corporate
governance environment, but it looks
like progress. We care about dividend
collection now. We are talking about
small signs that we are moving some-
where.
On a lot of levels we have come up
to the standards, not of the world, but
of a normal emerging market. Russian
capital markets or emerging markets a
few years ago were a pre-market, a
proto-market. I think we are in the
emerging-market category now.
On the equity side, there is a lot of
attention about rapidly developing
markets for new technology shares. It
is possible that with a lot of work, we 
can have a new issues market for
promising young Russian companies.
I question how many promising
young Russian companies there are at
that stage of development and whether
they ought to have access to capital
markets and whether investors are
going to risk their money on another
bubble. But the fact that we are able to
focus on our new issues is startling.
Finally, electronic commerce tech-
nology and innovation in stock mar-
kets in the West are impacting Russia.
All across Europe, in particular, we 
see the emergence of pan-national
exchanges. These people are interest-
ed in trying to embrace Russia as part
of these exchanges. 
People want to include Russian
shares in their international
exchanges. We will be there; probably
as a small participant. But folks will be
trading, from their offices in London,
Russian shares just as there is trading
for European shares. Those kinds of




Economic Senior Counselor 
Embassy of the Russian 
Federation 
I agree with my colleagues that the
challenges which Russia faces now are
quite big. And it is clear that the
changes that have taken place in this
year as well as in previous years have
not been sufficient to guarantee the
sustainable growth of the economy.
But please do not miss the basic
condition that for years, Russia has
been functioning in the same way as
the United States or Europe. It was a
period of radical transformation.
Now the situation is different.
Maybe it is premature to say that
Russia has turned the corner, but in 
some respects it has. We have turned
enormous corners to change the for-
mer Soviet communist regime toward
a democratic market society.
I cannot agree that the rule of law
does not exist in Russia. Now we do
have courts that really play an impor-
tant role in economic life. Hundreds
of court decisions were taken in these
years preserving the rights of the
shareholders. Russian courts, step by
step, are implementing new laws, laws
of a market economy. In Russia, we
have completely changed the laws
regarding the functioning of the mar-
ket infrastructure. During the past ten
years of Russian history, we have com-
pressed the history of centuries in
other countries.
It is natural that in these years of
change, the young market economy in
my country has not always pleased for-
eign businessmen. It is understandable
that the legal and moral basis of the
society we are aiming for is not yet 
stable and is not what you in the West
would want it to be.
Our society’s poverty still doesn’t
permit us to guarantee sustainable
growth. All that is clear. But it is 
obvious too that in the last year, we
have dramatically changed the situa-
tion, achieved real economic growth.
Maybe it is not sufficient, but still 3.5
percent growth in our GDP in 1999 is
something. Twelve percent industrial
growth in the first quarter of this year;
8 percent in the first quarter of last
year. It is real industrial growth.
The growth was supported by oil
prices, but oil companies only give 10
percent of Russian tax revenues. At the
same time, when prices for oil were
high, the prices for other raw materials
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were down substantially. And Russia is
dependent not only on oil, but other
raw materials and other productions.
Not every one of them is in a good
position just now. 
There was devaluation of the ruble,
and it contributed to growth as well.
But the most important change is that
after so many years of dramatic
reforms, for the first time we are facing
real economic growth. The dramatic
change is that the people, for the first
time, see hope and are feeling the
changes of the previous years improv-
ing their life.
We have entered a new period of
political stability in Russia. Both the
President and the government are
unanimous on future economic and
political development of the country.
Some people say that Mr. Putin is not
enacting quick economic reform, but
do you want such kind of fast actions
immediately after he came to power?
For so many years, many of you have
spoken to us, saying “Your society is
unstable, everything is changing, we
do not understand what is happening.” 
I would think that we need no 
dramatic changes just now. Let them
think twice or several times before
doing something. The actions of
President Putin show the Russian 
government quite well understands the
necessary measures, the structural
measures, the moral changes which we
have to introduce to our political life,
to our society. Step by step, these
changes will be introduced.
The government understands the
necessity of improving the investment
climate of the country, improving the
shareholders’ rights, improving the
functioning of the laws and the laws’
execution, commercial laws, and exe-
cution of the decisions. There are
plans for reform in the banking 
system, in the system of the execution
of the law of the country, in the collec-
tion of tax, and in the land reform.
Many people have spoken of the
need to strengthen the authority of the
government. I can assure you the
Russian government understands it.
As to the proposal to reduce
Russian political ambitions to the level
of the present GDP level, I will dis-
agree with it. The geographic, histori-
cal, and intellectual potential in my
country, all the history, will not permit
us to abstain from the idea of being an
equal international player in the politi-
cal arena with other major players.
Now nobody is speaking just now
about renewing the empire era, but in
the future who will think that Russia
only has to focus on its own problems,
on its own necessities, on its own situa-
tion? We are and will be one of the big
powers in the world. I think it is these
factors which should encourage busi-
ness people to come, to invest, and to
participate more actively in the new
Russian history.
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PANEL 2 — THE U.S. ROLE
What can U.S. business and 





Chase Manhattan Corporation 
I have recently come back from two
weeks in China and I have been think-
ing about ways in which China and
Russia relate and differ in their
approaches to development. From past
trips to Russia, I have picked up from
many people that there is envy, in a
way, about how China has approached
its move to a market economy. I am
not sure that the envy and the nostal-
gia that some Russians feel in looking
at China is merited. 
True, China has attracted $35 bil-
lion in direct foreign investment in the
last five years, in Shanghai alone. And
the rate of flows into China of FDI
averaged between $35 and $40 billion
a year, compared to what we heard
today of about $2.8 to $2.9 billion into
Russia. However, the Russians do not
have vast numbers of overseas expatri-
ate investors as does China. They don’t
have the Taiwanese investors. They
don’t have those from Singapore and
Southeast Asia, and they don’t have
the Vancouver Chinese. So you start
with a very different template in look-
ing at foreign direct investment in
Russia.
We often talk about flight capital
with respect to Russia. But few people
realize that there is flight capital from
China as well. In fact, it was estimated
to be about $20 billion last year going
out of China. Not all Chinese nationals
are convinced that the road will be
smooth enough for them to keep all
their assets at home. 
Our panelists are knowledgeable
about the Russian environment and we
look forward to their presentations.
EUGENE LAWSON
President
U.S.-Russia Business Council 
There are many developments that
make us feel better these days about
Russia. First, the results of the Duma
election last December indicate that if
the executive branch were to promote
a reform agenda — and we will see
shortly — there is obviously a clear
working majority that can produce leg-
islative success for Mr. Putin. The vote
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on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
is indicative of this.
Second, the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty was adopted 355 to 55.
Those are perfect examples of this.
However, as was pointed out, 70 
percent of the Duma is new, and that
makes for a substantial learning curve
in that very important branch.
Yeltsin’s resignation ended a 
period of erratic leadership. One
should remember that Russia is a
super-presidential power, and without
a strong and effective leader in the
presidency, there can be no hope of
meaningful systemic change.
Thirdly, the Russian economy is
certainly improving. It has enjoyed 11
or 12 straight consecutive months of
industrial growth.
Fourth, Mr. Putin’s win without a
runoff, coupled with the results of the
Duma elections, may lead to a period
of political stability in which business
plans can be devised and, we think,
executed. That would be certainly a
wonderfully nice change from what we
have had in the previous four or five
or six years or so.
The advisers in the Putin camp
also breathe confidence.  Some of the
legislative priorities that they described
are most assuredly on the mark.  Part 2
of the tax reform legislation is high up
on the priority list. 
The Putin team has utilized execu-
tive prerogative to institute a five-
fold increase in the deductibility of
standard business expenses, such as
advertising and training, which is really
close to the heart of people doing
business in Russia. 
Those are some of the positive
signs that we see today. However, The
American Chamber of Commerce in
Russia and the Council have an agen-
da of several issues on which we would
like to see progress.
The first is tax reform and a better
record of dealing with American com-
panies to resolve the tax problems; sec-
ond, strengthen the rule of law and
especially investor protections; third,
progress in intellectual property rights,
which is crucial; fourth, the passage of
a land code to help with the agricultur-
al reform agenda; fifth, improving the
banking system in Russia. 
It is awfully hard to do business in
Russia unless you have a credible bank-
ing system. The Ex-Im Bank, for all
intents and purposes, is closed down.
The statement at the bank was that the
door is open but the window is closed. 
My desire is to see the Ex-Im Bank
have an open door to our exporters,
clear policies, and a transparent mis-
sion for its Russia portfolio. Ex-Im
Bank is a lender of last resort, but with
Russia’s current ratings we can’t get a
commercial lender to work with us.
Russia’s credit rating is very tough. Not
very many of the big banks are going
to lend money to Russia at the present
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time. So for U.S. exporters to get the
financing they need to do business in
Russia, it is absolutely essential that
they be able to access the Ex-Im Bank.
The more we work to strengthen
commercial ties, the better our rela-
tions on all levels would be. In the
end, the trade, commercial, economic
ties, investment ties, will truly be the
ties that will bind us together. 
DOUG GARDNER
Partner
Arthur Andersen, Moscow 
This year, Arthur Andersen will cele-
brate our tenth year in Russia. We now
have over 600 partners and staff
throughout the CIS. Most of those are
in Russia, most of those are in Moscow.
It is important to operate properly
in Russia from day one. Know the
rules, know the laws, know the regula-
tions, and comply with them. You may
not like all of them. They may not be
consistent with the laws that you are
familiar with from the United States.
But you are in Russia. If you go in and
you try to play by their rules, that is, a
lot of the unwritten rules, you will lose, 
because you are ultimately an outsider.  
Andersen had a large international
client who had a tax inspector prob-
lem. The tax inspector knew this com-
pany made a lot of money and thought
they would try to scare the manage-
ment. And they scared them pretty
good. They said that they knew a con-
sulting firm that would make this prob-
lem go away for a fairly significant con-
sulting fee. My client was ready to pay
that. They did not want to tangle with
the Russian tax authorities. But we
advised them that it was absolutely the
wrong thing to do. A very long story
made short, they ultimately paid the
consultant. Unfortunately, to this day
they still have tax problems, because
that tax inspector knows, OK, we got
to these guys once, we will get to them
again.
If we look at Andersen’s experi-
ence in representing our clients in
Russia, we have been very successful 
in defending their interests in tax
protests.
When you come into Russia, plan
properly and be flexible. I think the
last few years have demonstrated you
have to expect the unexpected in 
the Russian market. The August crisis,
for many, many foreign companies,
many American companies, drew a
substantial loss. They lost staff, they
lost assets, they lost market, they were
very confused about what to do. Many 
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of those companies did not have a
plan. Those plans must exist, I think,
any time you go into an emerging mar-
ket, but I think particularly in a market
like Russia.
Develop local management and
directors, and train, train, train your
staff. Shortly after I got to Moscow in
‘94 and into early ‘95, we hit our peak
of expatriates in our Russian practice.
At that peak we were about 60 expatri-
ates. Today we are operating with
about 30, with two or three of those
due to roll out this summer. None of
those will be replaced. We now have
six Russian partners in our firm, and
essentially every single manager we
have, to operate a professional services
firm of over 600 staff, is a Russian citi-
zen. We have no expatriate managers. 
Get involved in the professional
organizations. Use whatever lobbying
capabilities you have available through
the U.S. Government or through other
organizations. That can be very power-
ful, and it will allow you to focus and
get a consistent message through to
the responsible individuals in the
Russian structures, in the Russian 
government, in Russian commercial
structures.
We do not accept bribes. Because if
you do, you are going to corrupt your
whole staff, and the only thing in our
business, in the professional services
business, is our people. They are really
our only asset. We own some furniture
and we own some computers. But, at
the end of the day, our people are our
assets.
If we corrupt that by setting a bad
example, I think we would be very
sorry. 
U.S. businesses should recognize
that Russians are intelligent and proud
individuals. It is the system that is 
corrupt. In the proper environment
local managers flourish. 
Russians core technical skills are
world class. You couldn’t get better
mathematicians and some of the
world’s top computer programmers
are Russian.
With the international community,
and that includes Russia herself, we
need to work to eliminate opportuni-
ties for corruption and capital flight.
At the end of the day, the corruption
issue is one of the top issues that has
to be addressed. The Russian
Government is concerned about it and
they want their capital to stay at home.
This is something where I think there
is some common ground.
I would say legal reforms are
absolutely the first thing that has to be
done. Without legal reforms you can
put all the taxation reforms you want
in, but if the laws don’t support you, if
you can’t find out who the owner is of
a company, at the end of the day it is
all a lot of wasted effort. You are not
going to know who controls that capi-
tal, who controls that organization.
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Second on the agenda would be
the tax system. I believe most of the
capital flight from Russia is largely 
driven by tax avoidance. We have to
agree on a long-term strategy for coop-
eration with other Western countries
and Russia herself. We must all agree
on what the issues are and all focus on
those. The preaching has got to end.
There are very intelligent people on
both sides of this question, both from
the U.S. side and the Russian side, and
I know we will get to the right answer.
JACK BROUGHER
Director
Russia and Independent 
States, U.S. Department of
Commerce 
Since Russia’s independence, two U.S.
administrations have operated under
the presumption that one of the most
important ways to help Russia is to
assist in attracting investment and
trade; that this is absolutely necessary
for Russia’s efforts to create a growing
market economy.
I think a truism that has developed
among many people working with
Russia in the ‘90s is that one also has
to work at the grassroots, at the work-
ing level, and, to the extent one can,
with the regions. We have many exam-
ples of this. I will mention just two
interesting ones:
The first is a project that grew out
of a conclusion drawn by business 
people on the West Coast that delays
in Russian customs clearance constitut-
ed the single biggest barrier to busi-
ness with the Russian Far East. After
four and a half years of very intense
discussion and work, we have reached
the point where this project, which is
called ClearPac, is clearing U.S. goods
into Vladivostok and Sakhalin on a
pilot basis and, we hope, will begin
operations this year in two more ports,
clearing goods in two days instead of
the usual seven to ten. 
When we are done, we will have a
working model system for modern 
customs clearance that the Russian
Government can adopt, if it wishes, to
modernize customs clearance opera-
tions around Russia. 
Many people do not know that
U.S. Government officials played a key
role in getting the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium Project back on track after
several years of delays. After simply sit-
ting for several years without moving,
this project is now under construction
and will transport oil from fields in
Kazakhstan through Russia and the
Black Sea, and put Russia in a key role
as a transit corridor for energy from
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the Caspian area along with other cor-
ridors. U.S. Government officials
played a key role in facilitating that,
and I think that there are other 
constructive things that we could do
together in the future if we can find 
a common approach.
There are also some government-
to-government tools that have been
successful. We have a U.S.-Russia trade
agreement, with specific provisions
covering basic intellectual property
protection, which is going to be
increasingly important as Russia
attempts to compete internationally.
There is a bilateral investment treaty
with Russia signed by the United States
and ratified by the U.S. Senate and the
President, which is before the Russian
Duma. It would provide some basic
protections which, as Russia modern-
izes, would give U.S. investors a little
more confidence.
Then there is the World Trade
Organization. The WTO, of course,
lays out a detailed blueprint by which 
Russia could prepare itself to partici-
pate in the world economy and, really,
WTO membership is a necessity if a
country wishes to be a major partici-
pant. Russia has to do some significant
prioritizing in regards to what it thinks
is most important for it to do first.
There is a program in the
Commerce Department called the
Special American Business Internship
Program. We have had a thousand
interns from Russia. More than 65 
percent of those interns have reported
in a survey that they subsequently have
established a business relationship with
American companies, and 85 percent
have reported that they have been able
to apply what they learned in their
own organizations in Russia. 
In conclusion, I would say that
time has confirmed, and reinforced,
the validity of the concept that Russia
will attract trade and investment in
large volumes only when it makes
more progress in establishing a viable
business environment. Thus, this
should continue to be a priority for
both U.S. Government and private 
sector cooperation with Russia. 
Given President Putin’s constructive
comments about improving the busi-
ness climate, it appears that the
American business voice may be lis-
tened to even more in Russia than
before and, hopefully, acted upon.  
In today’s age of the internet and
e-commerce, there may be significant
prospects for grassroots work with
Russia and direct commercial diploma-
cy that do not go through the two
national governments. Training and
exchanges are also likely to be more






In spite of the ups and downs in the
Russian economy, government, and
U.S.-Russian relations, Boeing’s pres-
ence has continued to grow steadily in
Russia for the past eight years. We are
proud of our engagement in Russia.
The vast majority of our activities there
have been successful, and we plan to
continue our work with our Russian
partners.
During the post-Cold War period,
we have witnessed an unprecedented
consolidation of the world’s aerospace
and defense industries.  Boeing has
not only done the obvious, with merg-
ers and acquisitions; we have also
searched the world for the best aero-
space talent and infrastructure, and
engaged it. 
Russia is an important piece of that
engagement. It is the only country in
the world which combines these four
factors: First-class aerospace resources;
A united, semi-private industry;
Underutilized capacity; and a large,
long-term demand for airplanes.
Boeing has an interest in identify-
ing the best and working with the
Russian aerospace industry in ways that
are of mutual benefit. We have done
just that over the last nine years to the
tune of over a billion dollars in invest-
ment and turnover in Russia.
Looking first at space, Boeing is
the world’s leading specialist in aero-
space systems integration. That is why
we are the prime contractor for the
International Space Station, an enor-
mous program with contributors from
over 16 countries around the world.
The leading partners in these 
programs are the Americans, Russians,
and Europeans.
Part of Boeing’s work in Russia was
overseeing and integrating the first
Space station module, Zarya. That
meant managing over $200 million 
in investments for NASA. This was a
fantastic learning experience for
Boeing, NASA, and our Russian part-
ners. Boeing established an office
inside the factory of what had been
one of the Soviets’most valued military
enterprises — the producer of the 
SS-18 missiles and the Proton rockets.
We learned how to work with Russian
engineers, executives, and factory
workers, and they learned how to work
with us — not altogether easy, I can
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assure you — and together we pro-
duced the first Space Station module,
on cost and ahead of schedule.
The Boeing Technical Research
Center in Moscow houses a number of
joint research, design, engineering,
and training activities. We contract
directly with selected Russian compa-
nies in a way that lets them retain their
employees. Boeing does not want to
contribute to Russian brain drain —
quite the opposite, we have done what
we can to prevent it.
In 1993, we began working with
Russia’s largest titanium company,
VSMPO, to assist them in meeting
Western aerospace standards. This
allowed VSMPO to sell to the world
market. We procure about 20 percent
of all our commercial products’ titani-
um from Russia, which is worth
approximately $250 million over six
years. Boeing is also actively support-
ing a project of great interest to the
Russian, U.S., and other governments:
the development of new, transpolar
routes — everyone who flies will enjoy
shorter routes from North America to
Asia. Our airline customers will enjoy
increased and more efficient opera-
tions. Russian regional and federal
governments will enjoy infrastructure
enhancement and the associated eco-
nomic benefits.
Despite the ever-changing political
situation, Boeing has maintained rela-
tionships with key industrial and gov-
ernment leaders, and the reality is that
we can do business successfully in
Russia. Boeing is prepared to expand
its investment in and engagement with
our Russian partners. However, like
many other companies we need help
from government to create a better
business environment.
Some suggestions include: 
First, our governments should
revive the Vice President-Prime
Ministerial commission. This commis-
sion proved extremely effective in
managing bilateral issues and facilitat-
ing U.S.-Russian business. 
Second, we encourage the Russian
Government to find renewed energy
for its own economic reforms. We will
not pretend to advise Russia on the
best ways to reform its tax, property,
investment, and other laws. The
healthier Russian industry, the better
our ability to work with it.
Third, the Russian and U.S. 
governments should place increased
emphasis on further introducing 
standard contract law into the Russian
system.
Fourth, I’d like to suggest that
both governments renew their commit-
ment to joint programs such as the
International Science and Technology
Corporation and Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs. By providing
examples, introductions, and seed
money, the governments facilitate 
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collaborative business that proves to 
be a multiple of their investment.
Fifth, and last, the Russian and
U.S. Governments might consider a
cooperative effort focused on prepar-
ing the way for Russian accession into
WTO. We all win through fair trade.
In the end, it is the Russian and
American people and businesses who
will provide a firm foundation for 
stable, positive U.S.-Russian relations.
Boeing has been working for nearly
ten years to contribute to this founda-
tion. These kinds of activities by
our governments will increase our 
ability to do so. 
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